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Assessing Monetary Policy Effects Using
Daily Federal Funds Futures Contracts
James D. Hamilton
This paper develops a generalization of the formulas proposed by Kuttner (2001) and others for
purposes of measuring the effects of a change in the federal funds target on Treasury yields of differ-
ent maturities. The generalization avoids the need to condition on the date of the target change and
allows for deviations of the effective fed funds rate from the target as well as gradual learning by
market participants about the target. The paper shows that parameters estimated solely on the basis
of the behavior of the fed funds and fed funds futures can account for the broad calendar regular-
ities in the relation between fed funds futures and Treasury yields of different maturities. Although
the methods are new, the conclusion is quite similar to that reported by earlier researchers—
changes in the fed funds target seem to be associated with quite large changes in Treasury yields,
even for maturities of up to 10 years. (JEL: E52, E43)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2008, 90(4), pp. 377-93.
and September 1979 on which there was a change
in the target, Cook and Hahn estimated the follow-
ing regression by ordinary least squares (OLS):
(1)
Their estimates of λs for securities of several differ-
ent maturities are reported in the first column of
Table 1. These estimates suggest that, when the
Fed raises the overnight rate by 100 basis points,
short-term Treasury yields go up by over 50 basis
points and there is a statistically significant effect
even on 10-year yields.
Subsequent researchers found that the mag-
nitudes of the estimated coefficients for λs were
significantly smaller when later data sets were
used. For example, column 2 of Table 1 reports
Kuttner’s (2001) results when the Cook-Hahn
regression (1) was reestimated using data from
June 1989 to February 2000; see also Nilsen (1998).
However, Kuttner (2001) also identified some
conceptual problems with regression (1). For one
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conomists continue to debate how
much of an effect monetary policy has
on the economy. But one of the more
robust empirical results is the observa-
tion that changes in the target that the Federal
Reserve sets for the overnight federal funds rate
have been associated historically with large
changes in other interest rates, even for the
longest maturities. This paper contributes to the
extensive literature that tries to measure the
magnitude of this effect.
One of the first efforts along these lines was by
Cook and Hahn (1989), who looked at how yields
on Treasury securities of different maturities
changed on the days when the Federal Reserve
changed its target for the fed funds rate. Let is,d
denote the interest rate (in basis points) on a
Treasury bill or Treasury bond of constant matu-
rity s months as quoted on some business day, d,
and let ʾd denote the target for the fed funds rate
as determined by the Federal Reserve for that day.
Using just those days between September 1974
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the change in the target ʾd that occurred on day d
many days earlier, in which case those expecta-
tions would have already been incorporated into
is,d–1. In the limiting case when the change was
perfectly anticipated, one would not expect any
change in is,d to be observed on the day of the
target change. To isolate the unanticipated com-
ponent of the target change, Kuttner used fd, the
interest rate implied by the spot-month fed funds
contract on day d. These contracts are settled on
the basis of what the average effective fed funds
rate turns out to be for the entire month containing
day d. Because much of the month may already
be over by day d, a target change on day d will
have only a fractional effect on the monthly
average. Kuttner proposed the following formula
to identify the unanticipated component of the
target change on day d:
(2)
where Nd is the number of calendar days associ-
ated with the month in which day d occurs and
td is the calendar day of the month associated
with day d. Kuttner then replaced (1) with the
regression
(3)
with additional modifications if d were the first
day or one of the last three days of a month.
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Kuttner found that the values for ʳs were essen-
tially zero, meaning that if target changes were
anticipated in advance, then they had no effect
on other interest rates. Kuttner’s estimates of λs,
the effects of unanticipated target changes, are
reported in column 3 of Table 1 and turn out to be
a bit larger than the original Cook-Hahn estimates.
Poole and Rasche (2000) proposed to side-
step the issues associated with a mid-month target
change by using not the spot-month contract on
day d but instead the one-month-ahead contract,
that is, the interest rate implied by a contract
purchased on day d for settlement based on the
average fed funds rate prevailing in the following
month, denoted fd
1. They then replaced the expres-
sion in (2) with
(4)
Their estimates for λs using this formulation
turned out to be similar to Kuttner’s and are
reported in column 4 of Table 1.
However, mid-month target changes remain
an issue for the Poole-Rasche estimates because
there is always the possibility of a second (or even
a third) change in the target some time after day
d and before the end of the following month;
indeed, this turned out to be the case for about
half of the target changes observed between 1988
and 2006. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2007)
developed an analog to Kuttner’s formula (2) based
on the date of the next target change that followed
% ξd
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Table 1
Alternative Estimates of the Response of Interest Rates to Changes in the Federal Funds Target
Study Cook-Hahn Kuttner Kuttner Poole-Rasche
Specification (1) (1) (2)-(3) (4)-(3)
Sample 1974-79 1989-2000 1989-2000 1988-2000
s = 3 months 0.55** 0.27** 0.79** 0.73**
s = 6 months 0.54** 0.22** 0.72** —
s = 1 year 0.50** 0.20** 0.72** 0.78**
s = 5 years 0.21** 0.10* 0.48** —
s = 10 years 0.13** 0.04* 0.32** 0.48**
NOTE: *indicates statistically significant with p-value < 0.05; **denotes p-value < 0.01.after the one implemented on day d; see also
Gürkaynak (2005).
Another potential drawback to either (2) or
(4) was raised by Poole, Rasche, and Thornton
(2002). These authors noted that, particularly
prior to 1994, market participants may not have
been perfectly aware of the target change even at
the end of day d, in which case these formulas
would include a measurement error that would
bias the coefficients downward. Poole, Rasche,
and Thornton developed corrections for the esti-
mates to allow for this measurement error.
A related issue is that the series for ʾd, the
actual target change, is itself subject to measure-
ment error, as indeed Kuttner (2001) and Poole,
Rasche, and Thornton (2002) used slightly differ-
ent series. Learning about the target change pre-
sumably also began well before day d. For both
reasons, one would think that data both before
and after day d should typically be used. In this
paper I develop a generalization of the Kuttner
(2001) and Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002)
adjustments for purposes of estimating the param-
eter λs. The basic idea is to suppose that there
exists some day within the month at which the
target may have been changed, but to choose
deliberately not to condition on this day for pur-
poses of forming an econometric estimate. The
paper also generalizes the earlier approaches by
explicitly modeling the difference between the
effective fed funds rate and the actual target.
The next section begins with an examination
of the relation between the target rate chosen by
the Fed and the actual effective fed funds rate.
The third section develops a simple statistical
description of how these deviations, along with
the process of learning by the market about what
the fed funds target is going to be for this month,
would determine the volatility of the spot-month
futures rate. The fourth section shows how the
parameters estimated from the behavior of the
effective fed funds rate and the spot-month futures
rate can be used to predict calendar regularities
in the estimated values for a generalization of the
coefficient λs. The final section finds such calen-
dar regularities largely borne out in the observed
relation between Treasury rates and daily changes
in the spot-month futures rate and develops new
estimates of this parameter. Although the method
and data set are rather different from the earlier
researchers, my estimates in fact turn out to be
quite similar to those originally found by Kuttner
(2001) and Poole and Rasche (2000).
THE EFFECTIVE AND TARGET
FEDERAL FUNDS RATES
In this paper, time is indexed in two different
ways, using calendar days t for developing theo-
retical formulas and business days d to apply
these ideas to actual data. The theoretical formu-
las will be developed for a typical month consist-
ing of N calendar days indexed by t = 1,2,...,N,
whereas the data set will consist of those days
d = 1,2,...,D for which there are data on both
Treasury interest rates and fed funds futures rates;
d = 1 corresponds to October 3, 1988, and d = D =
4,552 corresponds to December 29, 2006. The
empirical sample for all estimates reported in
this paper also excludes the volatile data from
September 13 to September 30, 2001.
The effective fed funds rate for calendar day t,
denoted rt, is a volume-weighted average of all
overnight interbank loans of Federal Reserve
deposits for that day. All numbers in this paper
will be reported in basis points, so that, for exam-
ple, a 5.25 percent interest rate would correspond
to a value of rt = 525. Since October 1988, the
Chicago Board of Trade has offered futures con-
tracts whose settlement is based on the average
value for the effective fed funds rate over all the
calendar days of the month (with Friday rates, for
example, also imputed to Saturday and Sunday).
For a month that contains N calendar days, settle-
ment of these futures contracts would be based
on the value of
(5)
The terms of a given fed funds futures contract
can be translated1 into an interest rate, ft, such
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1 Specifically, if Pt is the price of the contract agreed to by the
buyer and seller on day t, then ft = 100 × ￿100 – Pt￿.become known by the end of the month) turns
out to be bigger than ft, the buyer of the contract
has to compensate the seller by a certain amount
for every basis point by which S exceeds ft. If the
marginal market participant were risk neutral, it
would be the case that
(6)
where Et￿.￿ denotes an expectation formed on the
basis of information available to the market as of
day t. This paper will consider only spot-month
contracts, that is, contracts for which by day t we
already know some of the values for r (namely, rτ
for τ ￿ t) that will end up determining S. My forth-
coming paper (Hamilton, forthcoming) demon-
strates that, for futures contracts at short horizons
(the spot-month, 1-month-ahead, and 2-month-
ahead contracts), expression (6) appears to be
an excellent approximation to the data, though
Piazzesi and Swanson (forthcoming) note poten-
tial problems with assuming that it holds for
longer-horizon contracts.
Suppose that the Fed changes the target for
the effective fed funds rate on calendar day n of
this month. Kuttner (2001) suggested that we
fE S tt = () ,
could use the change in the spot-month contract
price on day n to infer how much of the change
in the target interest rate caught the market by
surprise according to the formula
(7)
I will provide a formal derivation of (7) as a spe-
cial case of a more general statistical inference
problem explored below, but would first like to
comment on one potential drawback of (7), which
is that it implies a huge reweighting of observa-
tions that come near the end of the month (n near
N). Kuttner (2001, p. 529) recognized that this is
a potential concern here because (7) abstracts
from the deviation between the Federal Reserve’s
target for the effective fed funds rate and the
actual effective rate, and as a result magnifies
the measurement error for observations near the
end of the month. Kuttner himself avoided using
(7) for the last three days of the month. Other
researchers like Gürkaynak (2005) avoid applying
it to data from the last week.
Figure 1 plots the relevant variables for
December 1990, which was a particularly wild
month as banks adjusted to lower reserve require-
ments (Anderson and Rasche, 1996). Although
the Fed had lowered the target to 725 basis points
on December 7, the effective fed funds rate was
trading well above this the week after Christmas,
and speculators seemed to be allowing for a pos-
sibility of a big end-of-year spike up, such as the
584-basis-point increase in the effective fed funds
rate that was seen in the last two days of 1985 or
the 975-basis-point spike between December 28
and December 30, 1986. In the event, however,
the effective funds rate plunged 200 basis points
on December 31, 1990.
Because the December 1990 futures contract
was based on the effective rate rather than the
target, speculators were watching these events
closely. The futures rate was trending well above
the new target of 725 basis points in the latter part
of December, partly because the month’s average
would include the first week’s 750-basis-point
target values, partly because the effective rate had
been averaging above the new target subsequently,
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Effective Fed Funds Rate, Target Fed Funds
Rate, and Fed Funds Futures Rate,
December 1990up. When it became clear on December 31 that
the last day of the year generated a big move down
rather than up, the December futures contract fell
by 23 basis points on a single day. Formula (7)
would call for us to multiply this number by 31,
to deduce that the interest rate surprise on this
day was some 713 basis points, plausible perhaps
if the market was anticipating a spike up to 1,250
rather than the plunge down to 550 that actually
transpired. Although this is an extreme example,
it drives home the lesson that one really wants
to downweight the end-of-month observations
rather than magnify them in the manner suggested
by the expression in (7).
The next section proposes a more formal state-
ment of this problem and its solution. A necessary
first step is to document some of the properties
of the deviation between the target that the Fed
has in place for business day d (denoted ʾd) and
the actual fed funds rate. The effective fed funds
rate, rd, was taken from the FRED database of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (which in turn
is based on Board of Governors release H.15), and
the target ʾd prior to 1994 is from the FRED series
that comes from Thornton (2005) and since 1994
is from Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
transcripts. I first estimated the following regres-
sion (similar to the models in Taylor, 2001, and
Sarno, Thornton, and Valente, 2005) by OLS
(standard errors are in parentheses):
(8)
This regression establishes that there is mod-
est serial correlation in deviations from the target.
Of particular interest in the next section will be
rr e dd d d −= + − () +
() ( )
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Squared Residuals by Day of Month
NOTE: The figure plots the average squared residuals from a regression of the deviation of the fed funds rate from the target on its
own lagged value, by day of the month (in basis points). 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated by the upper and lower box
lines, and predicted values from regression (9) are indicated by the dashed line.the calendar variation in the variability of e ˆd. Let
ˉjd = 1 if day d occurs on the jth calendar day of




j=1 then gives the average squared resid-
ual as a function of the calendar day of the
month:
The estimated values β ˆ
j are plotted as a function
of the calendar day j in Figure 2 along with the
95 percent confidence intervals for each coeffi-
cient. A big outlier on January 23, 1991, (when the
funds rate spiked up nearly 300 basis points on
a settlement Wednesday) is enough to skew the
results for day 23. Apart from this, the most notice-
able feature is an increased volatility of the devi-
ation of the funds rate from the target toward the
end of a month. One can represent this tendency
parametrically through the following restricted
regression:
(9)
where td is the calendar day of the month associ-
ated with business day d. The predicted values
from (9) are also plotted in Figure 2. In the next
section, a simple theoretical formulation based
on (8) and (9) will be used to characterize the
modest predictability of deviations from the target
and their tendency to become more pronounced




Suppose that market participants know that,
if the Fed is going to change the target within a
given month consisting of N calendar days, it
would do so on calendar day n, so that its target
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The effective fed funds rate for each day is the
sum of the target for that day plus the deviation
from the target, denoted ut:
It follows from (5) and (6) that
(10)
On the day before the target change, I presume
that market participants had some expectation of
what the target was going to be, denoted En–1￿ʾn￿.
The actual target would deviate from this by some
magnitude hn:
If the equilibrium fed funds price is determined
by risk-neutral rational speculators, the forecast
error hn would be a martingale difference sequence
that represents the content of the news about ʾn
that arrived on the day of the target change itself.
Similarly,
where hn–1 is the news that arrived on day n–1
of the Fed’s intentions on day n, and
Under rational expectations, {ht} should be a
sequence of zero-mean, serially uncorrelated
variables, whose unconditional variance is
denoted σh
2. Notice that h1 represents the infor-
mation that the market receives on day 1 about
the value for the target that the Fed will adopt on
day n, h2 represents the new information received
on day 2, and so on, with
(11)
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an AR(1) process with an innovation variance
that increases at the end of the month:
where the empirical results suggest values of ˆ =
0.30, ʳ0 = 283, ʳ1 = 1,746, and δ = 0.5. Then
(12)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (10) gives
(13)
From (13) we can then calculate the change




































































































































ʾ L h h





































































































whereas for t > n, changes in futures prices are
driven solely by the deviation of the effective fed
funds rate from the target:
It follows that the variance of daily changes in the
spot-month futures rate would be given by
(15)
Prior to 1992, the day of a target change would
often (but not always) occur the day after an FOMC
meeting. Since 1994, it usually has occurred on
the day of an FOMC meeting, but there are excep-
tions: Three times in 2001 (January 3, April 18,
and September 17) the Fed changed the target
without a meeting, and in August and September
of 2007 there was active speculation that the Fed
was considering or possibly had even already
implemented an intermeeting rate cut. Rather
than treat day n as if always known to the econo-
metrician, I have followed a different philosophy,
which is to ask, How would the data look if they
were generated by (15) but the econometrician
does not condition on knowledge of the particular
value of n? Suppose that the day of the target
change (which the formula assumed was known
to market participants as of the start of the month)
could have occurred with equal probability on any
one of the calendar days n = 1,2,...,N. If we let ʷ
denote the unknown day of the target change, then
the unconditional data would exhibit a calendar
regularity in the variance that is described by
Ef f n
Nn
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Expression (16) describes the variance of
changes in the spot-month rate as the sum of two
terms. The first term (κ1￿t￿) represents solely the
contribution of deviations of the effective funds
rate from the target. For days near the beginning
of the month (N – t large), this is essentially equal
to ʳ0/￿1 – ˆ￿
2 (the unconditional variance of ut)
divided by N
2 (because each ut contributes with
weight 1/N to the monthly average). This declines
gradually during the month (because there are
fewer days remaining for which the serial corre-
lation in ut contributes to the variance) but then
rises quickly at the end of the month because of
thelargevalueofʳ1, reflectingtheincreasedvolatil-
ity of the deviations from the target at month end.
The second term (κ2￿t￿) represents the contribution
of target changes to the volatility of the spot-month
rate. This contribution declines monotonically as
Hamilton











Squared Spot-Month Change by Day of Month
NOTE: The figure plots the average squared change in the spot-month futures rate, by day of the month (in basis points). 95 percent
confidence intervals are indicated by upper and lower box lines, and predicted values from regression (19) are indicated by the
dashed line.the day of the month t increases. This is because,
as the month progresses, it becomes increasingly
likely that the target change for the month has
already occurred and there is no more uncertainty
about the value of ʾn for that month. Added
together, expression (16) implies that the variance
of changes in the spot-month futures rate should
decline over most of the month but then increase
at the very end.
Expression (16) was derived under the
assumption that at the beginning of every month
market participants are certain that there will be
a target change on day n of the month. If instead
there is a fraction ρ of months for which people
anticipate a change on some day n and a fraction
1 – ρ for which they are certain there will be no
change, the result would be that the last term in
(16) would be multiplied by ρ:
(17)
where
This model can be tested using daily data on
fed funds futures contracts.2 Figure 3 plots regres-
sion coefficients along with 95 percent confidence
intervals from a regression of the squared change
in the spot-month futures rate on calendar day j:
(18)
where ˉjd = 1 if business day d occurs on calendar
day j and is zero otherwise. In other words, β ˆ
j is
the average squared change for observations falling
on the jth day of a month. These indeed exhibit
a tendency to fall over most of the month but then
rise at the end.
ʳρ σ 2
2 = h.
Ef f t t tt − () = () + () −1
2
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Let td denote the calendar day associated with
business day d (in other words, if ˉjd = 1, then
td = j). I then tested whether the specific function
derived in (17) could account for this pattern by
estimating via OLS the following relation:
(19)
Note that all the parameters appearing in the
functions κ1￿t￿ and κ2￿t￿ are known as described
above on the basis of the observed behavior of
deviations of the effective fed funds rate from its
target, so that only a single parameter—the coef-
ficient on κ2￿td￿ in equation (19)—was estimated
directly from the behavior of the futures data.
This parameter, ʳ2, has the interpretation of being
the variance of daily news the market receives in
a typical month about the upcoming Fed target
(recall equation (17)):
Note also that (19) imposes 30 separate restric-
tions on the 31 parameters of the unrestricted
regression (18). The F(30, 4,521) = 0.59 test sta-
tistic leads to ready acceptance of the null hypoth-
esis that this relation is indeed described by the
function given in (16) with a p-value of 0.96
(again, treating κj￿t￿ as known functions). The
model thus successfully accounts for the tendency
of the volatility of the spot-month futures rate to
decline over most of the month but then increase
the last few days. The actual volatility seems to
increase more at the end of the month than the
model predicts, though it is possible to attribute
this entirely to sampling error.
INFERRING MARKET
EXPECTATIONS OF TARGET
CHANGES FROM THE SPOT-
MONTH FUTURES RATE
We are now in a position to answer the pri-
mary question of this paper, which is, What does
an observed movement in the spot-month futures
rate signal about market expectations about the
target rate that is going to be set for this month?
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2 Data for October 3, 1988, through June 30, 2006, were purchased
from the Chicago Board of Trade; data for July 3 through January 29,
2007, were downloaded from the now-defunct web site
spotmarketplace.com. For d corresponding to the first day of the
month (say the first day of February for illustration), fd – fd–1
was calculated as the change in the February contract between
February 1 and the last business day in January. For all other days
of the month, it was simply the change in the spot-month contract
between day d and the previous business day.Let ʛt denote the information set available to mar-
ket participants as of date t, and let Ωt = {ft,ft–1,…}
be the information set that is going to be used by
the econometrician to form an inference, where
it is assumed that Ωt is a subset of ʛt, the previous
target ʾ0 is an element of both Ωt and ʛt, and the
day n target change is an element of ʛt but not of
Ωt. Our task is to use the observed data Ωt to form
an inference about how the market changed its
assessment of ʾn based on information it received
at t, that is, to form an assessment about
We can calculate the linear projection of Yt on Ωt
as follows (e.g., Hamilton, 1994, equation [4.5.27]):
(20)
























t Ω () =










2 t t− () 1 .
(21)
Substituting (21) and (17) into (20) establishes
(22)
The parameters determining κ4￿t￿ have all been
estimated above from the properties of the devia-
tions of the fed funds rate from the target and
squared changes in the spot-month futures rate.
Figure 4 plots the function κ4￿t￿ for these
parameter values. To understand the intuition
for this function, consider first the case in which
the fed funds rate is always identically equal to
the target, so that σ
2
ε,t and κ1￿t￿ are both zero. From
(14), the expected squared change in the spot-
month rate conditional on knowing that the target
change will occur on day n would be given by
(23)
whereas the covariance of the spot-month futures
rate change with the expected target rate change
would for this case be
Thus, if we knew both the day of the target change
and that there were no targeting errors, the infer-
ence would be
Êh n t f f tt t n t t Ω ,, , , ʷσ β ε == 

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Plot of κ4(t) as a Function of twhere
which reproduces Kuttner’s (2001) formula (7)
for the special case considered by Kuttner, namely,
t = n. If we don’t know the day of the target change,
but still impose no targeting error, we’d use the
unconditional moments:
(24)
For N large and t = 1, the numerator of (24) would
be approximately (1/2) and the denominator about
(1/3), so that the coefficient β￿1￿ would be close
to 1.5. This is bigger than Kuttner’s expression (7),
which equals unity at n = 1, because a one-unit
increase in h1 will increase the expected target on
day n > 1 by one unit but increase the futures rate
on day t = 1 by only [￿N – n + 1￿/N] < 1. Kuttner’s
formula assumes that, if we use the day t = 1
change in the futures, the target change occurs
on day n = 1, whereas our formula assumes that
in all probability the actual change is going to be
implemented on some day n > 1.
Going from t to t + 1, we drop N
–1[￿N – t + 1￿/
N] from the numerator and drop the smaller mag-
nitude N
–1[￿N – t + 1￿/ N]
2 from the denominator,
so that the ratio (24) monotonically increases in t
until it finally reaches the same value as (7) on
the last day of the month:
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In the presence of targeting errors, expression
(22) adds the term κ1￿t￿/ʳ2 to the denominator of
(24), so, as noted by Poole, Rasche, and Thornton
(2002), the optimal inference in the presence of
targeting errors always puts a smaller weight on
ft – ft–1 than does (24). This explains why the
function κ4￿t￿ in Figure 4 begins at a value below
1.5 for t = 1. The function κ4￿t￿ then begins to
increase monotonically in t for the same reason as
in (24). However, as t increases, both the numer-
ator and denominator in (24) become smaller,
whereas κ1￿t￿/ʳ2 is approximately constant (at least
for small t). This latter effect eventually over-
whelms the tendency of (22) to increase in t, and
it begins to fall after the 20th day of the month.
This decline accelerates toward the very end of
the month as κ1￿t￿ starts to spike up from the end-
of-month targeting errors.
RESPONSE OF INTEREST RATES
TO CHANGES IN FEDERAL FUNDS
FUTURES
We’re now ready to return to the original ques-
tion of how interest rates for Treasuries of various
maturities seem to respond to the spot-month fed
funds futures rate. Deviations of the funds rate
from the target should have a quite negligible effect
on maturities greater than three months, because
the autocorrelation implied by (8) dies out within
a matter of days. We should therefore find that, if
we regress the change in Treasury yields on the
change in the spot-month futures rate, the value
of the regression coefficient should exhibit exactly
the same pattern over the month as the function
in Figure 4—the impact should rise gradually
through the first half of the month and fall off
quickly toward the end of the month.
As a first step in evaluating this conjecture,
divide the calendar days of a month into j = 1,2,
...,8 octiles and let ˈjd = 1 if business day d is
associated with a calendar date in the jth octile
of the month. For example, ˈ1d = 1 if day d falls
on one of the first four days of the month, whereas
ˈ8d = 1 if it falls on the 29th, 30th, or 31st. Let
is,d denote the yield in basis points on day d for
a Treasury bill or bond of constant maturity s
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rate. (Daily Treasury yields were taken from the
St. Louis FRED database.) Consider OLS estima-
tion of
(25)
In Figure 5, the OLS estimates, α ˆj￿t￿,s, along with
their 95 percent confidence intervals, are plotted
as a function of calendar day t = 1,2,...,31 for
s = 12, which corresponds to a 1-year Treasury
security. These indeed display very much the
predicted pattern—an increase in the fed funds
futures rate around the middle of the month has
a slightly bigger effect on the 1-year Treasury rate
than it would have at the beginning of the month,
ii f f u sd sd j s j d d d s d
j





and a much bigger effect than it would have
toward the end of the month. The same pattern
holds for shorter yields (Figure 6) and longer
yields (Figure 7).
According to the theory, we can capture the
exact effect predicted for each calendar day by
regressing the change in interest rates on the prod-
uct between the change in fed funds futures and
the function in (22):
(26)
where td is the calendar day of the month associ-
ated with business day d, λs is the effect of a one-
basis-point increase in the target rate on a Treasury
security of maturity s, and usd results from factors
influencing yields that are uncorrelated with
changes in the expected target rate. Note that all
ii t f f u sd sd s d d d s d ,, , − = () − () + −− 1 41 λκ
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The Effect of Federal Funds Rate Changes on 1-Year Treasury Yields
NOTE: The figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the OLS regression of daily change in the 1-year
Treasury yield on daily change in the spot-month futures rate, with different coefficients for each octile based on the calendar day of
the month (denoted by the rectangles and vertical lines) and the predicted values for the coefficients for each day of the month as
implied by (26) (denoted by the dashed line).the parameters governing κ4￿t￿ have been inferred
from the behavior of the fed funds rate and futures
alone. Estimates of λs for different maturities, s,
are reported in the first column of Table 2, and
values of λ ˆ
sκ4￿t￿ for different maturities, s, are
plotted as a function of t in Figures 5 to 7.
The adequacy of (26) was investigated in a
number of different ways. One obvious question
is how important the function κ4￿td￿ is for the
regression. This can be explored by comparing
(26) with a specification in which changes in
futures prices have the same effect on interest
rates regardless of when within the month they
occur:
(27)
The specifications (26) and (27) are non-nested,
but it is simple enough to generalize to a model
that includes them both as special cases:
ii c f f u sd sd s d d s d ,, . − =− () + −− 1 1
(28)
If model (26) is correct, then we should be able
to accept the null hypothesis that cs = 0, whereas
if (27) is correct, we should accept the null hypoth-
esis that λs = 0. If neither specification is correct,
then we should reject both null hypotheses. The
second and third columns of Table 2 report the
OLS coefficient estimates and standard errors for
(28). For maturities greater than two years, we
accept the null hypothesis that cs = 0 and strongly
reject the hypothesis that λs = 0. For maturities
less than two years, both hypotheses are rejected,
suggesting that there is more to the response of
short-term interest rates to fed funds futures than
is captured by (26) alone. Even in these cases,
however, the term involving κ4￿t￿ makes by far
the more important contribution statistically. I
conclude that the model successfully captures a
ii
cf f t f f u
sd sd
s dd s ddd
,, −=




14 1 λκ s sd.
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Effect on 3-Month Treasury Yield




The Effect of Federal Funds Rate Changes on 3-Month and 6-Month Treasury Yields
NOTE: The figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the OLS regression of daily change in the 3-month
and 6-month Treasury yields on daily change in the spot-month futures rate, with different coefficients for each octile based on the
calendar day of the month (denoted by the rectangles and vertical lines) and the predicted values for the coefficients for each day of
the month as implied by (26) (denoted by the dashed line).Hamilton
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The Effect of Federal Funds Rate Changes on 2-Year, 3-Year, and 10-Year Treasury Yields
NOTE: The figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the OLS regression of daily change in 2-year, 3-year,
and 10-year Treasury yields on daily change in the spot-month futures rate, with different coefficients for each octile based on the
calendar day of the month (denoted by the rectangles and vertical lines) and the predicted values for the coefficients for each day of
the month as implied by (26) (denoted by the dashed line).clear tendency in the data for the impact to vary
across the month, although it seems to leave
something out in the description of the response
of short-term interest rates.
In the same spirit, we can nest (26) and (25):
(29)
The results, shown in the last two columns of
Table 2, are not as encouraging. In every case, we
stronglyrejectthehypothesisthatα1s =…=α8s =0,
meaning that for each maturity, s, there are sta-
tistically significant deviations from the broad
monthly pattern that is predicted by (26), and in
every case readily accept the hypothesis that λs = 0,
meaning that the specific variation within octiles
that is predicted by (26) is not particularly found
in the data.
These last results are perhaps not too surpris-
ing given the many approximations embodied in
(26), which assumed among other things that all
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both weekend effects and that some business days
convey much more important economic news
than others (on this last point, see Poole and
Rasche, 2000, and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson,
2005).
We can in fact carry that last point a step fur-
ther and estimate a separate coefficient λjs for
every calendar day j = 1,…,31:
(30)
where ˉjd = 1 if day d falls on the jth day of the
month. Figure 8 plots the OLS estimates of λjs as
a function of the calendar day j along with 95 per-
cent confidence intervals and the predicted values
for the function λjs implied by (26) for 1-year
Treasuries. Again the broad pattern seems to fit
well, though again there are large deviations on
some days that are well beyond what could be
attributed to sampling error, and formal hypoth-
esis tests comparing (30) with (26) (which the
former formally nests as a special case) lead to
overwhelming rejection, with a p-value less than
10
–10 for each s. In addition to the details noted
ii f f u sd sd j s j d d d s d
j
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Table 2
The Effect of Federal Funds Futures on Interest Rates
With separate
Restricted octile effects added
effect With constant effect added (p-value for indicated H0)
Maturity λs cs λs α1s = … = α8s = 0 λs = 0
3 Months 0.658** 0.256** 0.499** (0.00)** (0.98)
(0.022) (0.089) (0.060)
6 Months 0.706** 0.286** 0.529** (0.00)** (0.45)
(0.021) (0.084) (0.056)
1 Year 0.748** 0.226** 0.608** (0.00)** (0.60)
(0.023) (0.095) (0.063)
2 Years 0.685** 0.159 0.586** (0.00)** (0.74)
(0.029) (0.112) (0.079)
3 Years 0.641** 0.143 0.552** (0.01)** (0.62)
(0.030) (0.122) (0.081)
10 Years 0.426** 0.082 0.375** (0.05)* (0.45)
(0.028) (0.115) (0.077)
NOTE: This table shows the regression coefficients relating change in the interest rate on securities with maturity s to change in the fed
funds futures rate. *indicates statistically significant with p-value <0.05; **denotes p-value <0.01. OLS standard errors are in parentheses.above, individual outliers are highly influential
for the daily regression (30), and one would want
to carefully model these non-Gaussian innova-
tions, usd, and GARCH effects before trying to
build a more detailed model that could reproduce
more of the unrestricted pattern. This and related
tasks, such as trying to use information about the
actual date of the target change when it is unam-
biguously known, using one-month or two-month
futures contracts in place of the spot rate, and
exploring the consequences of a secular change
in σh
2 (e.g., Lang, Sack, and Whitesell (2003) and
Swanson, 2006), we leave as topics for future
research.
Although there is much more to be done
before having a completely satisfactory under-
standing of these relations, I believe that the
approach developed here gives us a plausible
interpretation of the broad regularities found in
the data and a sound basis for generalizing the
Kuttner (2001) and Poole, Rasche, and Thornton
(2002) approaches. Although the methods involve
some new uses of the data, the conclusion I draw
is quite consistent with earlier researchers—
changes in the fed funds target seem to be associ-
ated with quite large changes in Treasury yields,
even for maturities of up to 10 years.
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